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Introduction
The Fourth Amendment mandates that citizens be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.1

To this end, the Supreme

Court holds that warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable.2

1

Despite declaring this general

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,

papers,

and

effects,

against

unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants

shall

supported

by

issue,

Oath

or

but

upon

affirmation,

probable
and

cause,

particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 222 (1960) (“[T]he Constitution forbids [] not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.”); DARIEN A.
MCWHIRTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE,

AND

PRIVACY 1 (1994) (suggesting that

Supreme Court precedent indicates the main purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect citizen’s privacy and property).
2

See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)

(emphasizing that searches carried out without prior judicial
approval are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948) (voicing
that searches and seizures require either a warrant issued by a

3

rule, the Court has carved out exceptions that give law
enforcement officials considerable flexibility with which to
conduct their day-to-day criminal investigations.3

One such

exception to the warrant requirement is that police may stop and
question an individual so long as the detaining officer has a
reasonable belief that criminal activity may be taking place.4
Furthermore, the Court permits this requisite reasonable
suspicion to be based on information provided by third-party

magistrate or the presence of specific, exceptional
circumstances); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
914 (1984) (stressing the warrant preference within the context
of searches).
3

See generally Jason K. Bryk, Anonymous Tips to Law Enforcement

and the Fourth Amendment:

Arguments for Adopting an Imminent

Danger Exception and Retaining the Totality of the Circumstances
Test, 13 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 277, 288–89 (2003) (listing
numerous exceptions to the general warrant requirement).
4

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (allowing police to

conduct an investigatory stop when the detaining officer
“observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot .
. . .”).

4

sources.5

This broad grant of power allows police substantial

leeway to investigate potential crime.
While the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to
allow officers to act without a warrant and on less than
probable cause, it has also identified specific limits as to the
type and quality of information police may use.

In Florida v.

J.L.,6 the Court unanimously recognized such a limit.7

While

acknowledging that police may use information from third parties
to establish reasonable suspicion, the Court clarified that
reasonable suspicion cannot be based exclusively on a bare-boned

5

See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (permitting the

use of information from a known informant who supplied the
information in person and who had provided reliable information
in the past); see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332
(1990) (authorizing the use of an anonymous tip that lacked
traditional indicia of reliability but provided substantial
predictive information about its subject that police could to
independently corroborate).
6

529 U.S. 266 (2000).

7

See id. at 274 (stating that police may not solely rely on an

anonymous tip that has no indicia of reliability).

5

anonymous tip.8

Consequently, the Court established an

evidentiary baseline for all future police detentions:

in order

to use third-party information as the basis for a stop or
search, police must first ascertain the informant’s reliability
by either discovering the tipster’s identity or verifying
sufficient predictive information related to the alleged crime.9

8

See id. (holding that an anonymous tip lacking sufficient

indicia of reliability, without more, is insufficient to justify
an investigatory stop and frisk).

The Court reasoned that an

anonymous tip, such as the tip in J.L. that alleged a man was
carrying a firearm, has none of the indicia of reliability
available from a known source, nor provides any predictive
information with which to verify the informant’s knowledge or
credibility.

Id. at 268.

Thus in J.L.,“[a]ll the police had to

go on . . . was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable
informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor
supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about
J.L.”
9

Id.

See id. at 271–72 (distinguishing the tip at issue from the one

relied on in White by explaining that the information provided
here could not be used to establish reliability regarding the
alleged criminal activity, but rather could only help police
locate and identify the accused person).

6

Where police cannot establish the informant’s identity and the
tip does not provide anything beyond readily observable
information, reasonable suspicion to detain the subject of the
tip can only be formed through independent investigation of the
alleged criminal activity.10
Nevertheless, the Court complicated this general rule by
hypothesizing that police might be able to act on a lesser
showing of reliability when an anonymous tip alleges a
sufficiently great danger,11 but subsequently declined to expound
on what circumstances would present such an extreme danger as to

10

See id. at 274 (“[W]e hold that an anonymous tip of the kind

contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and
frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of
a firearm.”).
11

See id. at 273–74 (“We do not say, for example, that a report

of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”).

However, in

discussing this possibility under the facts of J.L., the Court
explicitly declined to adopt an automatic firearms exception to
the reasonable suspicion analysis because it could easily be
abused and would likely lead to other broad exceptions.
272.

7

Id. at

allow for modification to the usual constitutional
requirements.12

Consequently, the Court left unanswered what set

of facts would warrant using a bare-boned anonymous tip as the
sole basis for initiating a seizure and search.13
As state and federal courts have applied the principles
from J.L. to a variety of circumstances involving anonymous
tips,14 one particularly troublesome area has been its
application to anonymous tips that allege potentially

12

See id. at 272–73 (explaining first that “extraordinary

dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions” and then
suggesting that certain circumstances may provide such immense
dangers that regular reliability considerations would not be
required).
13

See id. at 273 (“The facts of this case do not require us to

speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged
in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search
even without a showing of reliability.”).
14

E.g., United States v. Monteiro, 447 F.3d 39, 50 (1st Cir.

2006) (holding police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a
traffic stop based on an anonymous tip about an alleged shooting
where none of the allegations were independently corroborated by
police).

8

intoxicated motorists.15

Despite a nationwide effort to increase

public reporting of drunk drivers,16 decisions from courts across
the country reveal that there is substantial disagreement as to
the role these anonymous tips should play in an officer’s
decision to initiate a traffic stop.17

15

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Virginia v.

Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385) (listing cases).
16

E.g., NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., CITIZEN REPORTING

OF

DUI—EXTRA EYES

TO

IDENTIFY IMPAIRED DRIVING 4–5 (2006),
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/extraeyes/images/
3204EEReport.pdf (outlining the adoption of citizen reporting
programs nationally); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., SAFETY STUDY:
DETERRENCE

OF

DRUNK DRIVING: THE ROLE

OF

SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS

AND

ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE REVOCATIONS ¶8 (1984),
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1984/SS8401.htm (last visited Feb.
20, 2009) (describing how Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately,
a reporting program aimed at citizens, is increasingly being
adopted at the state level).
17

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 18

(listing cases); see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722,
729–30 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850 (2002)
(recognizing split of authority in light of J.L.); People v.
Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 814 (Cal. 2006) (acknowledging split of

9

This issue recently gained national attention when the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear Virginia
v. Harris.18

This case, coming from the Virginia Supreme Court,

authority); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 720–23 (Haw.
2004) (discussing authorities on both sides of the question);
State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 2003) (acknowledging
split of authority); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 864, 866
(Vt. 2000) (stating that majority of courts uphold traffic stops
based on anonymous tips but recognizing dissension of the case
law).
18

Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (mem.).

See,

e.g., Robert Barnes, Justice Won’t Review Case Involving
Anonymous Tip About Suspected Drunken Driving, THE WASHINGTON POST,
Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/20/
AR2009102001600.html (recognizing the denial of certiorari and
highlighting the dissention amongst the members of the Court in
regards to what role anonymous tips of drunk driving should play
in police investigations); cf. Ashby Jones, When Gay Met John:
An East Side Story, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 27, 2009,
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/27/when-gay-met-john-an-east-si
de-story/ (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts’s recent gift
of an unfinished bottle of wine to a journalist who happened to

10

concerned a Driving Under the Influence (DUI) conviction that
was overturned because the arresting officer stopped the
defendant’s vehicle solely on the basis of an anonymous tip
without corroborating any suspicious behavior.19

In an

impassioned dissent from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice
Roberts argued that both the frequency and deadliness of drunk
driving accidents might justify allowing stops of allegedly
intoxicated motorists solely on the basis of a bare anonymous
tip, without requiring corroboration of the tip’s criminal
allegations.20

He contended that declining to hear Harris was

effectively giving drunk drivers “one free swerve”21 before

be dining in the same restaurant may have been motivated in part
by the Chief Justice’s recently expressed attitudes towards
drunk driving).
19

Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008), cert.

denied, 130 U.S. 10 (2009) (mem.).
20

See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 11–12 (Roberts, C.J.,

dissenting) (acknowledging the split of authority and
distinguishing tips in this context, due to the threat posed by
drunk drivers).
21

Id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

11

police could initiate a stop, inevitably endangering countless
lives.22
The Chief Justice’s sentiments mirror many of the
rationalizations relied on by the majority of states and one
federal circuit that have spoken on this issue, which do not
require verification of the alleged criminal activity and
instead allow police to rely on an anonymous tip so long as it
is sufficiently detailed with innocent information that can
readily be confirmed.23

Alternatively, the minority of courts

22

Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

23

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 8

(summarizing that the majority of courts only require police
promptly corroborate innocent details of a sufficiently detailed
anonymous tip, such as a locating a vehicle in the area that
matching the information provided by the tipster); Denise N.
Trauth, Comment, Requiring Independent Police Corroboration of
Anonymous Tips Reporting Drunk Drivers:

How Several States

Courts are Endangering the Safety of Motorists, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
323, 323–24 (2007) (“[M]any state courts and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit have held that officers’
corroborations of non-criminal details in anonymous tips
reporting erratic or drunk driving can sufficiently justify
investigatory stops of vehicles even if officers have not

12

who have spoken on this issue require officers to personally
observe a motorist operating in an erratic manner before relying
on an anonymous tip to conduct an investigatory traffic stop,
rather than allowing the tip itself to singularly form the basis
for reasonable suspicion.24
Despite the recent denial of certiorari, this issue is ripe
for review and should be heard to conform this divisive issue to
the correct interpretation of the law.

In order to establish

the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate an investigatory

personally observed criminal activity or traffic violations.”);
see also United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir.
2001) (rationalizing that police may rely on anonymous tips of
erratic driving as they are presumptively more reliable since
they are likely provided by eyewitnesses who are observing
activity open to the public).
24

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (reversing

conviction for traffic stop based exclusively on an anonymous
allegation of erratic driving); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 15, at 8 (describing courts that do not
allow reasonable suspicion to be based entirely on an anonymous
report of a potential drunk driver); see also id. at 1
(explaining the split of authority regarding anonymous tips of
erratic driving to police).

13

traffic stop, police should be required to corroborate beyond
readily observable innocent details of an anonymous tip alleging
erratic driving.

Considerable Supreme Court precedent related

to warrantless seizures implies that police cannot rely solely
on an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving if the tip provides
no means to establish the informant’s reliability.25

Moreover,

the threat posed by a potentially intoxicated motorist is
inconsistent with the extraordinary danger exception suggested
in Florida v. J.L.
Part I of this Comment will examine the historical
development of Fourth Amendment case law as it relates to the
use of anonymous tips by law enforcement.

Part II will address

how these precedents apply in the context of investigatory
traffic stops of allegedly intoxicated motorists and will
examine the reasoning of jurisdictions on either side of the
issue.

Part III will present an analysis of the issue and argue

that police must corroborate beyond just innocent information
provided by an anonymous tip of dangerous driving.

Finally,

Part IV will conclude by recommending that the appropriate focus
should be on reducing the anonymity of anonymous reports of
erratic driving, rather than constructing exceptions for such
tips under the Fourth Amendment.

25

See infra Part II.

14

I.

Background
A.

Reasonable Suspicion Under Terry v. Ohio

The Fourth Amendment is principally concerned with
protecting citizens from arbitrary and oppressive governmental
encroachment to persons and property.26

To this end, the Supreme

Court generally requires government officials first obtain a
warrant based on probable cause before seizing a citizen or
searching their person or property.27

26

Despite this general

See JOHN WESLEY HALL JR., SEARCH & SEIZURE 29–30, 100 (Lexis Law

Publishing 2000) (1979) (describing that the Fourth Amendment is
intended to protect all citizens from capricious or unjustified
governmental intrusions); MCWHIRTER, supra note 1, at 140 (“The
Fourth Amendment was written, in the opinion of most Supreme
Court justices who have been called upon to interpret it, to
protect the private life of the people from unreasonable
intrusions by government officials.”).
27

See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The

Fourth Amendment’s] protection consists in requiring []
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”); INGA L. PARSONS, FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE 61 (Anthony Bocchino ed., 2005)

(discussing the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment).

15

edict, the Supreme Court has, over time, enumerated a number of
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements.28

One

such exception is reasonable suspicion—a reduced standard of
suspicion that gives police authority to investigate possible
criminal behavior without obtaining a warrant and on less than
the probable cause needed to arrest.29

28

Thus, it is understood

See generally PARSONS, supra note 27, at 8–9, 61 (listing

recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment).
29

See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S.

177, 185 (2004) (explaining that reasonable suspicion allows an
officer to briefly stop a person and investigate the suspicion);
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000) (describing
reasonable suspicion as greater than an undeveloped hunch of
criminal activity, but below probable cause); United States v.
Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) (reiterating that
an investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion that the
person to be stopped is involved in criminal activity, a
standard less than the probable cause needed for arrest); PARSONS,
supra note 27, at 5 (“Probable cause is a level of suspicion
necessary to obtain a warrant or effect an arrest . . . .
less than a full seizure is made, . . . mere reasonable

16

Where

that despite the preference for warrants and probable cause,
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not force a police officer who
lacks ‘probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders
and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.’”30
In the landmark decision Terry v. Ohio,31 the Supreme Court
first announced and explained the reasonable suspicion
exception.32

In Terry, the Court considered a situation in which

a veteran law enforcement officer observed several men acting

suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot can
warrant the intrusion.”).
30

Jon A. York, Search and Seizure:

Law Enforcement Officers’

Ability to Conduct Investigative Traffic Stops Based Upon an
Anonymous Tip Alleging Dangerous Driving When the Officers Do
Not Personally Observe Any Traffic Violations, 34 U MEM. L. REV.
173, 178 (2003) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145–46
(1972)); see also PARSONS, supra note 27, at 19 (noting that prior
to Terry, all police seizure, regardless how minor, required
probable cause).
31

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

32

See id. at 30 (allowing an investigative stop if an officer

“observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude
in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot .
. . .”).

17

suspiciously, which subsequently prompted him to confront them
and pat down their outer clothing for weapons.33

The Court ruled

these limited involuntary searches were constitutionally
permissible, and further announced that police may conduct an
investigatory stop and limited search for weapons where the
officer reasonably suspects that criminal activity is occurring
or is about to occur.34

33

Id. at 6–7.

A plainclothes detective watched two men

deliberately walk in front of a store window approximately
twelve times and then meet up with a third individual.
6.

Id. at

Believing the men were preparing to commit a crime and

fearing they might be armed, the detective approached them,
identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their
names.

Id. at 6–7.

Upon receiving only muttered responses, the

detective turned one of the men around, patted down his outer
clothes, and discovered a handgun concealed in a pocket.
7.

The detective subsequently frisked the other two men, which

lead him to find another firearm.
34

Id. at

Id.

See id. at 30 (enunciating the stop and frisk doctrine, which

allows a police officer to investigate his suspicions if he
reasonably suspects criminal activity may be taking place, and
to conduct a limited frisk for weapons if in the course of the
investigation the officer reasonably fears a person may be armed

18

While Terry involved an investigatory stop on the street,
similar investigatory stops have subsequently been upheld in the
vehicle context, so long as the officer reasonably deduces that
an occupant of the vehicle is engaged in criminal activity.35

and dangerous); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123–24 (clarifying
that reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable
cause but more than a general, unparticularized hunch); Robyn
Silvermintz, Note, In the Wake of Florida v. J.L. – When
Anonymous Tips Give Police Reasonable Suspicion, 19 TOURO L. REV.
741, 744–46 (2003) (summarizing Terry as carving out an
exception to the probable cause requirement because it allows an
officer to make reasonable inquiries and perform a limited
search of outer clothing based on reasonable conclusions drawn
from the officer’s observations).
35

See, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985)

(reiterating that police officers may conduct a brief,
investigatory stop of a moving vehicle when the officer
reasonably suspects the vehicle’s occupants are engaged in
criminal activity); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682
(1985) (affirming a vehicle stop based on reasonable suspicion
of drug trafficking); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421
(1981) (validating an investigatory vehicle stop where officers

19

Accordingly, an investigatory traffic stop constitutes a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment just as the investigatory stop on the
street was a seizure in Terry.36

As a result, a brief

investigatory stop of a vehicle similarly requires reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity grounded in definite, objective
facts.37

If an officer initiates a traffic stop without

reasonably suspected, based on the totality of the
circumstances, that a vehicle contained illegal aliens).
36

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996)

(articulating that an investigatory traffic stop is considered a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even if the stop is limited
in duration and purpose); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657
(1979) (emphasizing that vehicle stops interfere with citizens’
liberty because they hinder freedom of movement, are
inconvenient, time-consuming and can create anxiety); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“It is
agreed that checkpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d
722, 726 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that vehicle stops
constitute a search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
37

See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228 (requiring, at a minimum,

reasonable suspicion that someone in the vehicle has been, or

20

reasonable suspicion, or if a stop is founded on an
unreasonable, subjective belief of criminal activity based on
otherwise lawful behavior, it will violate the Fourth
Amendment.38

currently is involved in criminal activity); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (stressing that
traffic stops require reasonable suspicion based on specific,
objective facts that an individual is engaged in criminal
activity); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Wis. 2001)
(“At the time of the stop, the officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, objectively warrant a
reasonable person with the knowledge and experience of the
officer to believe that criminal activity is afoot.”); cf.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (articulating that an officer’s experience
entitles him to draw specific inferences from the available
facts).
38

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d at 147 (“Lawful conduct

that the officer may subjectively view as unusual is
insufficient to generate a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is engaged in criminal activity.”); see also Alabama
v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328, 330 (1990) (announcing that the
determination as to whether an officer’s suspicions are

21

B.

The Use of Third-Party Information in Police

Investigations
In order to form the reasonable suspicion necessary to
initiate an investigatory stop or search, officers can rely on
sources other than their own firsthand observations, such as
information provided by a third party.39

Indeed, such

reasonable for a Terry stop and frisk is done by examining the
totality of circumstances, including the “content of information
possessed by police and its degree of reliability”); cf. Prouse,
440 U.S. at 663 (invalidating a program in which motorists were
randomly stopped under the pretext of checking for unlicensed
drivers).

But cf. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 US.

444, 455 (1990) (permitting the use of sobriety checkpoints to
stop motorists without regard to particularized suspicions of
criminal activity).

Note, however, that the Court had

previously emphasized that checkpoints are substantially less
intrusive than a roving patrol stop.

See Martinez-Fuerte, 428

U.S. at 558–59.
39

See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (allowing

police action on the basis of information from a known informant
with established credibility).

22

information can even be provided by an anonymous informant.40
But while police may use an informant’s tip to focus their
independent investigation, such information cannot be the sole
basis of suspicion without first demonstrating, via the totality
of the circumstances, that it comports with the Fourth
Amendment.41
When a known informant provides the information, the tip
alone will often justify an investigatory stop and search.42

40

In

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 (1983) (utilizing a

totality of the circumstances test to establish probable cause
from on an anonymous note that alleged criminal activity because
it contained detailed information about future actions and
police were able to independently corroborate most of the note’s
allegations).
41

See id. at 238 (offering the test as one in which, “given all

the circumstances . . . including the ‘veracity and ‘basis of
knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.”).
42

See PARSONS, supra note 27, at 32 (noting that a tip from

someone who has previously provided accurate information will
almost always survive judicial scrutiny).

23

Adams v. Williams,43 the Supreme Court held a police officer was
sufficiently justified in acting on the basis of a known
informant’s unverified tip.44

In making this determination, the

Court stated that the unverified tip had sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify an investigatory stop because the officer
received the tip in person from a known informant who had
established his credibility by providing accurate information in
the past.45

Conversely, when the source of information provided

to police is anonymous, something more is required before police
can initiate a seizure.46

43

407 U.S. 143 (1972).

44

See id. at 146 (finding a officer’s reliance on a known

informant’s tip justified where the informant provided the
information in person and had been known to provided reliable
information in the past).
45

See id. at 146–47 (characterizing a known informant’s tip as

having sufficient indicia of reliability to merit a Terry stop,
even if it fell short of level required for an arrest or
warrant).
46

See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (asserting an

anonymous tip contains no indicia of reliability, and therefore
requires something beyond the tip’s allegations if it is to be
used by police); Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (requiring independent

24

When information is provided to police anonymously, the tip
itself may not demonstrate the informant’s veracity or basis of
knowledge, and therefore cannot be used for a Terry stop or
search without further police action.47

However, in Illinois v.

Gates,48 a case in which police anonymously received a message
with detailed allegations of present and future criminal acts,

police corroboration of allegations contained in an anonymous
note).
47

See White, 496 U.S. at 329 (noting that an anonymous tip did

not contain a foundation with which to establish sufficient
indicia of reliability); see also HALL JR., supra note 26, at 138
(addressing generally the difficulty of meeting the dual prongs
of veracity and basis of knowledge with informant hearsay);
PARSONS, supra note 27, at 33 (“Anonymous tips are the bottom of
the food chain when it comes to reliability of information.
Most troublesome for judges is the fact that the tipster, by not
identifying himself, is not subjected to any penalties if the
information turns out to be false.”); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and
Seizures § 126 (2009) (noting that information from a reliable
informant can form the basis of probable cause, while
information from an informant whose reliability is unknown may
need to be independently corroborated).
48

462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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the Court announced that the traditional indicia of reliability,
veracity and basis of knowledge, should be considered as part of
the larger totality of the circumstances.49

Therefore, by

independently corroborating major elements of the note police
were able to indirectly infer that the anonymous informant
possessed inside information, permitting them to proceed with a
search of the areas described in the note despite the author’s
anonymity.50
Similarly, the Court has allowed law enforcement to rely on
an anonymous tip containing none of the traditional indicia of
reliability when officers independently corroborate predictive
information from the tip.51

In Alabama v. White,52 police

researched an anonymous tip’s allegations of future acts and
established the accuracy of the predictive information
sufficient for the officers to reasonably conclude that the
informant possessed inside information about the subject of the

49

Id. at 225.

50

Id. at 244–45.

51

See White, 496 U.S. at 332 (allowing an inference that an

anonymous informant had a special familiarity with the subject
of their tip once predictive future information within the tip
was independently verified by police).
52

496 U.S. 325 (1990).
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tip.53

Thus, while the Court labeled the decision a “close

call,”54 it declared that under the totality of the circumstances
the corroborated tip provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to
warrant an investigatory stop.55
C.

Florida v. J.L.:

Rejecting the Bare-boned Anonymous

Tip as Grounds for Reasonable Suspicion
By allowing law enforcement to infer reliability of an
anonymous tip by independently corroborating its content, the
Court broadened the spectrum of information that could be used
to create reasonable suspicion but failed to clarify what type
of corroboration was permissible.56

53

However, in Florida v. J.L.,

See id. at 332 (“[U]nder the totality of the circumstances the

anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the investigatory stop . . . .”).
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See Silvermintz, supra note 34, at 750–51 (noting that White’s

failure to provide a standard for what constitutes adequate
corroboration led lower courts to different interpretations).
See generally York, supra note 30, at 180–83 (collecting cases
of lower courts that relied on White to find reasonable
suspicion based on anonymous tips regarding firearms or erratic
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the Court established a baseline for police reliance on
third-party information.57

In an opinion authored by Justice

Ginsburg, the Court stated that where an anonymous tip is

driving where police only corroborated innocent details of the
tips).
57

Terry

said

“yes”

to

lowering

the

probable

cause

standard to reasonable suspicion for police officers
making an investigatory stop.

Adams said “yes” to the

‘indicia of reliability’ requirement on a tip made by
a known informant.
sufficiently
predictive

White said “yes” when the police

corroborated
information.

an
J.L.

anonymous
just

said

tip

with

“no”

to

bare-boned anonymous tips.
See Ernest Bates, Note, Search and Seizure—Anonymous Tips Lack
Sufficient Reliability to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for
Investigatory Stop-and-Frisks, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 803, 811 (2001)
(summarizing the Court’s “endpoint” in police discretion)
(citations omitted); Melanie D. Wilson, Since When is Dicta
Enough to Trump Fourth Amendment Rights?

The Aftermath of

Florida v. J.L., 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2005) (positing
that J.L. establishes an “evidentiary floor” for searches and
seizures allowed under Terry, and as such, provides a bright
line rule regarding anonymous telephone tips).
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bare-boned—in that it contains none of the traditional indicia
of reliability and consists of only readily apparent
information—police cannot infer the tipster’s reliability by
only corroborating the innocent, readily apparent details from
that tip.58
In Florida v. J.L., police received an anonymous phone call
alleging that a “young black male standing at a particular bus
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”59

Officers

responded to the location and found three black males, one of
which was wearing a plaid shirt, but neither saw a weapon nor
witnessed any suspicious behavior.60

Therefore, aside from the

allegation in the anonymous tip, the officers had no basis to
conduct an investigatory stop and frisk.61

58

In spite of this

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (recognizing

that an anonymous tip containing no predictive information gives
police no means to test the tipster’s basis of knowledge or
reliability).
59

Id. at 268.

60

Id.

61

See id. (noting the officers had no independent basis to

believe any of the three black men at the bus stop were involved
in a criminal act).
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shortcoming, the officers frisked the men and seized an illegal
firearm discovered in J.L.’s pocket.62
The Supreme Court rejected the subsequent conviction by
unanimously declaring that an anonymous tip that offers no
indicia of reliability or other means to assess the informant’s
credibility is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to
conduct a stop and frisk.63

Anonymous tips inherently have a low

degree of reliability and do not offer a straightforward means
to test either their allegations or their source.64

For that

reason, the Court noted that in order to assess the tipster’s

62

Id.

J.L. was subsequently charged with possessing a firearm

while under the age of 18 and for carrying an unlicensed,
concealed firearm.
63

Id. at 269.

See id. at 274 (2000) (establishing that an anonymous tip that

provides no means to assess either the informant’s basis of
knowledge or veracity cannot be used to initiate an Terry stop
and frisk, at least where the tip involves an allegation of a
firearm).
64

See id. at 270 (quoting White, 496 U.S. 325, 329) (“Unlike a

tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and
who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be
fabricated, ‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.’”).
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credibility, police must sufficiently corroborate the
allegations in an anonymous tip.65

However, unlike in White, the

Court further clarified that corroboration cannot be
accomplished solely through readily observable innocent
information, but must instead relate to the alleged criminal
acts.66

In doing so, the Court distinguished the bare-boned

anonymous tip in J.L. from the tip in White and stressed that
the independent corroboration used to infer inside information
in White only gave that tip a “moderate indicia of
reliability.”67

65

Thus, the Court emphasized that “[i]f White was

See id. at 271 (stating that anonymous tips require

corroboration with information from another source).
66

See id. (stating that readily observable information only

helps police locate the person the informant means to accuse,
rather than demonstrate that the informant possesses inside
information); R. Jason Richards, Using Anonymous Informants to
Establish Reasonable Suspicion for a Stop, 32 COLO. LAW. 61, 62
(2003) (observing that while the police in J.L. corroboration
the description from the anonymous tip, the tip was of limited
usefulness because it provided no predictive knowledge from
which to judge the informant’s knowledge or credibility).
67

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (emphasizing that independent

corroboration showing an anonymous tipster has some knowledge of
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a close case on the reliability of anonymous tips, this one
surely falls on the other side of the line.”68
Justice Kennedy, while “join[ing] the opinion in all
respects,”69 issued a separate concurrence to propose that there
may be other means to either establish the reliability or narrow
the anonymity of otherwise anonymous informants.70

Justice

Kennedy first agreed that where an informant is completely
anonymous, as was the case in J.L., the tipster is able to “lie
with impunity”71 because there is no way to assess the

a person’s future actions does not necessarily suggest the
tipster knows about all of the person’s affairs).

The court

expressly considered White a “close case” because the only
indicia of reliability was an inference of inside information;
an indicia absent in the tip in J.L.
68

See id.

Id. (distinguishing White’s moderate indicia of reliability

from the total absence of indicia of reliability in J.L.).
69

Id. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

70

See id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing that tips

that are anonymous in some aspects may also have elements with
which to assess the informant’s reliability).
71

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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informant’s credibility.72

However, he theorized that the

circumstances surrounding anonymous calls to police often have
other features that might be used to objectively assess an

72

See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that where a

court cannot assess an anonymous informant’s credibility, the
chance that the informant may be lying becomes unacceptable);
cf. Rex R. Anderegg, Cell Phone Tips of Crime and ‘Reasonable
Suspicion’, 78 WIS. LAW. 12 (2005) (suggesting that when an
informant is not completely anonymous, he risks potential
criminal penalties for making false reports, which should weigh
in favor of the informant’s reliability).

Along this same line,

Justice Kennedy indicates that if an informant provides
information in a way that places his anonymity at risk, such as
providing the tip in-person, this should be viewed as
presumptively more reliable.

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 276

(Kennedy, J., concurring); Wilson, supra note 57, at 218
(summarizing that lower courts generally hold in-person
anonymous tips as more reliable than anonymous tips over the
telephone); see also id. at 221–22 (arguing in-person tips allow
for establishing credibility, demeanor, knowledge basis, and
identity of the tipster).
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informant’s reliability.73

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence implies

that if the desired end is to be able to rely on anonymous tips,
the proper focus might be on reducing the anonymity of those
tips rather than attempting to dilute the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
Following the majority opinion’s explanation that
corroboration of innocent information from a bare-boned
anonymous tip is insufficient to justify police action, the
Court also declined to recognize that firearms posed such an

73

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(suggesting police can overcome a bare-boned anonymous tip by
establishing its reliability or identifying the tipster through
other means, such as instant caller identification, voice
recording, routine documentation of calls, or judging the
accuracy of consecutive anonymous calls from the same source);
see also Amanda Lisenby, Note, Informant Reliability Under the
Fourth Amendment in Florida v. J.L., 28 N. KY. L. REV. 172, 183
(2000) (arguing police should be required to make reasonable
attempts to establish a caller’s identity and suggesting that
the cost that there may be fewer informants due to a fear of
identification would be substantially outweighed by a greater
guarantee that officers will conduct reasonable searches based
on informants’ tips).
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inherent danger as to justify an automatic exception to the
reliability analysis.74

Specifically, the Court reasoned that to

allow reasonable suspicion to be automatically established
whenever an anonymous tip alleged the presence of a firearm
would invite abuse by those looking to subject other persons to
the invasive process of a police seizure and search.75
Additionally, the Court expressed concern that such an exception
for firearms would inevitably be used to justify exceptions in
other closely related areas—such as tips about illegal drug

74

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (rejecting a firearms exception to

the reasonable suspicion requirement for an investigatory stop
because it could too easily be abused and would be too difficult
to confine to just firearms).
75

See id. (asserting that a firearms exception would enable

anyone to subject another to a mandatory police detention and
search simply by anonymously alleging that person had an illegal
firearm); see also United States v. Walker, 7 F.3d 26, 31 (2d.
Cir. 1993) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (voicing concern that an
anonymous call to police containing a physical description and
criminal allegation, but little predictive information, may
actually have been placed in order to harass its subject, a
morbidly obese man).
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activity—which would unreasonably erode the foundations of the
Fourth Amendment.76
While choosing not to recognize a firearms exception, the
Justices nevertheless explicitly did not foreclose the idea that
particular circumstances might exist where an otherwise
insufficient anonymous tip could justify an investigatory stop.77
To illustrate this possibility, the Court stated, “[w]e do not
say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need
bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a
person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally
conduct a frisk.”78

Thus, while the Court hinted that an

anonymous tip could potentially allege such an extreme danger as

76

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (disallowing a firearms exception

and stating that “the Fourth Amendment is not so easily
satisfied”); Anderegg, supra note 72, at 14 (quoting J.L., 529
U.S. at 273) (“The Supreme Court flatly rejected the request [of
a firearms exception] on the ground that creating such an
exception would lead to a slippery slope of additional
exceptions, ‘thus allowing the exception[s] to swallow the
rule.’”).
77

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (identifying, in dicta, that an

extreme danger exception might exist for anonymous tips).
78

Id. at 273–74.
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to forgo the usual reliability requirement, the Justices
specifically chose not to elaborate since the facts of the case
were not applicable to such an exception.79

Consequently, a

number of lower courts have relied on this bald proposition to
distinguish bare-boned anonymous tips about drunk driving in
order to bypass J.L.’s holding and be used to justify
investigatory traffic stop where police corroborate innocent,
readily identifiable details of the tip.80

79

See id. at 273 (noting that an extreme danger exception might

exist, but choosing not to speculate on the exception within the
confines of the case).

“We do not say, for example, that a

report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of
reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a
firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”
See id. at 273–74.
80

E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir.

2001) (upholding a traffic stop based on an anonymous allegation
of dangerous driving, even though the detaining officer did not
witness any erratic or unusual behavior); see Brief of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 13, Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385)
(arguing that in the majority of cases, “all that is required is
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II.

Judicial Differences of Opinion About Anonymous Tips of

Possible Intoxicated Motorists
There is a clear division of opinion in jurisdictions that
have considered what role anonymous tips alleging potentially
intoxicated motorist should play in police investigations.81
Several state courts and one federal circuit court have held
that an anonymous call to police about an erratic driver is
sufficiently distinct from the anonymous report of a concealed
firearm in J.L. to justify police action.82

In general, these

a temporally proximate corroboration that a defendant’s car
matches the one described in the anonymous tip.”).
81

Compare Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (permitting investigatory stop

based on an anonymous tip where officer verified easily
observable innocent details), with Harris v. Commonwealth, 668
S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008) (rejecting an investigatory traffic
stop based on an anonymous tip where officer did not witness
reasonably suspicious driving).
82

See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (upholding stop based on

anonymous tip of erratic driving where officer corroborated most
innocent details of the tip); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d
1212, 1221 (Del. 2004) (upholding stop based on anonymous call
about erratic driving that provided the make, model, color,
license plate number and travel route of vehicle, as well as
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courts differentiate anonymous tips about dangerous driving in
three aspects, thereby justifying their use as the sole basis
for an investigatory stop.83

Conversely, other courts that have

race of the driver, where the officer corroborated only innocent
details); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 724 (Haw. 2004)
(allowing stop based on anonymous tip of dangerous driving that
listed the vehicle’s make, model, and license plate number,
despite that the officer did not witness any erratic driving);
State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 120 (Kan. 2003) (upholding stop
based on anonymous call that a Dodge pickup truck with Oklahoma
plates on a specific road was driving recklessly); State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Iowa 2001) (affirming stop by
distinguishing anonymous tips about erratic driving from other
contexts and noting the threat posed by intoxicated motorists);
State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1117 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)
(permitting a stop based on an anonymous tip due to the amount
of danger posed by a possibly drunk driver and because the
caller was believed to have contemporaneously observed the
erratic driving).

See generally Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari, supra note 15, at 18 (listing cases).
83

See, e.g., Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11–12 (2009)

(mem.) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that courts that have
upheld such investigative traffic stops distinguish J.L. by
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considered the issue reason that a bare-boned anonymous tip
about erratic driving lacks sufficient reliability to be
treated, without corroboration of the criminal allegations, as
anything more than an investigatory tool.84

Moreover, these

arguing that intoxicated drivers pose a greater imminent danger;
anonymous tips are likely from eyewitnesses observing a criminal
act in public, which instills higher reliability; and traffic
stops are less invasive and involve a lesser expectation of
privacy than similar in-person stops); see also Trauth, supra
note 23, at 340–42 (proffering that anonymous tips of erratic
driving can be distinguished from those relating to guns because
erratic driving is not a concealed crime and can be publically
observed; the mobile nature of cars suggests the abuse
considered in J.L. is less likely; erratic driving poses a
imminent threat to public safety; and the level of intrusion in
a traffic stop is temporary, brief, and public).
84

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (invalidating

traffic stop based on an anonymous tip with no corroboration of
alleged dangerous driving); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071,
1077 (Wyo. 1999) (holding traffic stop illegal where officer did
not personally observe the alleged erratic driving); State v.
Lee, 938 P.2d 637, 638–40 (Mont. 1997) (stating that anonymous
caller did not indicate whether his allegations were based on
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personal observation); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640–45
(N.D. 1994) (rejecting stop based on bare-boned anonymous tip
that was uncorroborated by police); Washington v. State, 740
N.E.2d 1241, 1243–46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that traffic
stop was not justified where officer did not witness erratic
driving or corroborate predictions of future behavior from an
anonymous caller); State v. Boyle, 793 So. 2d 1281, 1284–85 (La.
Ct. App. 2001) (finding stop based on anonymous tip
unconstitutional because officers did not witness any erratic
driving); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (stating corroboration of only readily
observable details is insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion); see also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734 (proposing that
predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable
where the tip “describes contemporaneous, readily observable
criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed by
another motorist”).

The court further argues that since most

erratic driving tips are provided by eyewitnesses, there is no
need to demonstrate the anonymous caller possesses inside
information.

Id.

41

jurisdictions have found that the threat posed by drunk driving
does not warrant an exception to the ordinary reliability
requirement.85
A.

Majority Approach:

Courts That Require Corroboration

of Only Readily Apparent Details from an Anonymous Tip of
Erratic Driving
First, courts upholding traffic stops based solely on an
anonymous call about erratic driving reason that such a tip is
presumptively more reliable than a similar call about a firearm
due to the likelihood that the tipster is contemporaneously
observing a public activity.86

85

As emphasized by the Supreme

See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 147

(rejecting traffic stop based entirely on an anonymous tip,
despite the motorist being subsequently found to be legally
intoxicated, because the detaining officer did not corroborate
the alleged erratic driving).
86

See, e.g., State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Iowa

2001) (distinguishing anonymous allegations of concealed
criminal activity from criminal activity conducted in public,
and further reasoning that the caller demonstrated his basis of
knowledge by witnessing the publically-committed act); see also
Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734 (proposing that predictive aspects of an
anonymous tip may be less applicable where the tip “describes
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Court of Vermont, “[w]hat is described in these drunk or
dangerous driving reports is a crime in progress, carried out in
public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its
commission.”87

Therefore, rather than requiring corroboration of

predictive facts to establish reliability, these courts hold
that an informant is presumptively reliable so long as they
allege to contemporaneously witness the erratic driving.88

These

contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the
case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist”).

The

court further argues that since most erratic driving tips are
provided by eyewitnesses, there is no need to demonstrate the
anonymous caller possesses inside information.
87

See id.

State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (Skoglund, J.,

concurring).
88

See Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220–21 (Del. 2004)

(assuming tips alleging erratic driving are more reliable
because providing a detailed description of a passing car would
be difficult unless the tipster was concurrently observing the
vehicle); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 723 (Haw. 2004)
(announcing that unlike the basis of knowledge of the informant
in J.L., the basis of knowledge of the anonymous tipster who
informed police about an erratic driver is clear); State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Iowa 2001) (concluding that
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courts generally allow an anonymous tip to justify an
investigatory stop when the caller describes a vehicle in
sufficient detail and the responding officer locates a vehicle
matching that description within a short timeframe.89

anonymous tips reporting concealed criminal activity are
sufficiently different from tips alleging criminal activity
conducted in public and noting the tipster’s basis of knowledge
was established by purporting to be an eyewitness); York, supra
note 30, at 189–90 (articulating that these courts generally do
not require verifying a tipster’s inside knowledge for crimes
open to the public, and instead rely on contemporaneous accounts
to establish an informant’s reliability).
89

See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 731–32 (utilizing three factors

to determine validity of a traffic stop based on an anonymous
tip of erratic driving:

(1) quantity of information provided

about the vehicle, (2) span of time between receiving the tip
and locating the vehicle, and (3) a suggestion that the
informant personally observed the erratic driving);
Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1221 (articulating that an anonymous
tip of erratic driving is presumptively more reliable where the
tipster provides a detailed description of the vehicle and an
“officer[] corroborat[es] the descriptive features of the
vehicle and the location of its travel in close temporal
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Second, these courts hold that the threat posed by a
potentially drunk driver is substantially greater and more
exigent than the dangers associated with an anonymous tip about
a firearm, thereby justifying police action under the
extraordinary danger exception suggested in J.L.90

These

proximity to when the report was made”); State v. Sousa, 855
A.2d 1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (announcing that whether an
anonymous tip creates reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop
depends on whether the tipster purports to be an eyewitness, the
level of detail of the tip, and the amount of time between
receipt of the tip and location of a matching vehicle); York,
supra note 30, at 187–88 (detailing various courts’ information
and time requirements).
90

E.g., United States v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 315–19 (4th Cir.

2007) (upholding stop based on a detailed anonymous tip alleging
an imminent threat to public safety); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d
810, 813 (Cal. 2006) (asserting the risk posed by a potentially
intoxicated driver established reasonable suspicion); Boyea, 765
A.2d at 867 (reasoning an “anonymous report of an erratic or
drunk driver on the highway presents a qualitatively different
level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency for prompt
action”); see also York, supra note 30, at 193–95
(distinguishing between anonymous tips regarding driving and
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jurisdictions reiterate the sentiments of the Supreme Court of
Vermont, which differentiated an anonymous call about erratic
driving from one involving a firearm and likened the threat
posed by a drunk driver as akin to a ticking time bomb:
In

contrast

to

the

report

of

an

individual

in

possession of a gun, an anonymous report of an erratic
or

drunk

driver

qualitatively

on

different

the

highway

level

of

presents
danger,

concomitantly greater urgency for prompt action.

a
and
In

the case of a concealed gun, the possession itself
might be legal, and the police could, in any event,
surreptitiously

observe

the

individual

for

a

reasonable period of time without running the risk of
death or injury with every passing moment.

An officer

in pursuit of a reportedly drunk driver on a freeway
does not enjoy such a luxury.

Indeed, a drunk driver

firearms by noting that erratic driving is a publically
observable crime that does not require familiarity with the
subject and poses a substantial imminent danger); cf.
Commonwealth v. Hurd, 557 N.E.2d 72, 72–73 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
(allowing anonymous tip where allegedly erratic driver was said
to have three children in the car, which presented an emergency
situation).

46

is not at all unlike a “bomb,” and a mobile one at
that.91
Furthermore, proponents of this position stress that an
anonymous tip about a motorist—unlike one involving a firearm—
cannot lead to a consensual encounter.92

These courts reason

91

Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 (Vt. 2000).

92

See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736 (suggesting that a consensual

encounter is an option in an allegation regarding a firearm, but
not where the allegation involves reckless driving); cf. York,
supra note 30, at 195 (highlighting that even if the danger
presented by an intoxicated motorist is no greater than that
posed by a firearm, police have comparatively fewer
investigation alternatives for suspected drunk drivers).

See

generally Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.429, 434–35 (1991)
(explaining that police may engage and make requests of
individuals without have any basis for suspicion, where the
individual consents to the encounter).

Proponents of this

position note that when police cannot initiate a consensual
encounter and are required police to wait until they personally
observe erratic behavior, it leads to one of three possible
scenarios:

“the suspect drives without incident for several

miles; the suspect drifts harmlessly onto the shoulder,
providing corroboration of the tip and probable cause for an
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that because police do not have this investigatory option,
requiring officers to wait to intervene until after they
personally observe erratic behavior creates an unreasonably
dangerous situation, since the longer the accused vehicle is
mobile the greater the probability that it will cause an
accident.93

arrest; or the suspect veers into oncoming traffic, or fails to
stop at a light, or otherwise causes a sudden and potentially
devastating accident.”
93

Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736–37.

See State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003) (“A motor

vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an instrument of
death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and
that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”)
(citations omitted); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 15, at 24 (arguing the “calculus is different” for
anonymous tips alleging drunk driver, in that the longer officer
waits before intercepting an allegedly intoxicated motorist, the
greater the likelihood of danger).

Alternately, some suggest

that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement could plausibly be extended to include the danger
posed by an allegation of a possibly drunk motorist.
supra note 3, at 296–97.
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See Bryk,

Finally, a number of courts excuse anonymous tips that
allege erratic driving under the rationale that a vehicle search
has a lower expectation of privacy and is inherently less
intrusive than a similar seizure and search of a person on the
street.94

The Supreme Court of Vermont exemplified this

reasoning in State v. Boyea95 by upholding a DUI conviction in
part by explaining that unlike an in-person stop and frisk, an
investigatory traffic stop is “a temporary and brief detention

94

See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)

(acknowledging the reduced reasonable expectation of privacy in
an automobile); Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (noting investigatory
traffic stops are less invasive than an investigatory stop and
frisk conducted in person on a public street); Trauth, supra
note 23, at 331 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 868) (characterizing
the liberty interest involved in a traffic stop as weaker than
the “hands-on violation of the person” in J.L.).
95

765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000).

In Boyea, an officer received

an anonymous report that a blue/purple Volkswagen Jetta with New
York license plates was being driven erratically on a certain
section of Interstate 89.

Id. at 863.

Within five minutes, the

officer found a vehicle matching the description and initiated a
traffic stop based on the tip, which subsequently led to Boyea’s
arrest for DUI.

Id.
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that is exposed to public view,”96 which creates less
interference with a citizen’s liberty interest.97
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which is the
only federal court to decide on this issue, relied on all three
of these justifications in United States v. Wheat98 to uphold a
stop based on an anonymous tip without police corroboration.99
An anonymous caller notified police that a tan or cream-colored
Nissan Stanza bearing a license plate containing the letters
W-O-C was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off

96

Id. at 868 (citation omitted).

97

See id. (validating a traffic stop based on an anonymous tip

by asserting that the liberty interest at stake is qualitatively
lower than in a hands-on search and seizure); see also Wheat,
278 F.3d at 734 (announcing that an investigatory traffic stop
is “considerably less invasive, both physically and
psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner that was at
issue in J.L.”); Trauth, supra note 23, at 342 (characterizing
traffic stops as having a lower level of intrusion because they
are temporary and exposed to the public).
98

278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001).

99

See id. at 737 (determining a traffic stop based on a call

from an anonymous motorist was reasonable under the totality of
the circumstances).
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other motorists, and “otherwise being driven as if by a
‘complete maniac.’”100

Shortly thereafter, a patrolling officer

saw a vehicle that matched the caller’s physical description and
immediately stopped the motorist without observing any irregular
or dangerous behavior, which lead to the subsequent arrest of
both the vehicle’s driver and passenger for possession of a
controlled substance.101

In upholding the stop, the court first

dismissed the need for predictive information in an anonymous
tip where the informant is describing a contemporaneous, readily
observable crime.102

The court then justified the stop by noting

that since a traffic stop involves a lesser invasion than a
traditional stop and frisk, a motorist’s right to be free of
unreasonable government incursion is outweighed by the imminent

100

Id. at 724.

101

Id. at 724–25.

While the anonymous caller reported a Nissan

Stanza, Wheat’s vehicle was a tan Nissan Maxima with a license
plate beginning with the letters W-O-C.
102

Id. at 724.

See id. at 735 (“We think that an anonymous tip conveying a

contemporaneous observation of criminal activity whose innocent
details are corroborated is at least as credible as the one in
White, where future criminal activity was predicted, but only
innocent details were corroborated.”).
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threat posed by drunk drivers and the limited investigative
options available to police.103
B.

Minority Approach:

Courts That Require Independent

Corroboration of Non-Innocent Details from an Anonymous Tip
of Erratic Driving
While the majority of courts that have addressed the issue
allow investigatory traffic stops where an officer corroborates
readily observable details of an anonymous tip about an erratic
driver, other courts hold that that an anonymous tip, by itself,
does not have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a
stop.104

103

Largely, these jurisdictions rely closely on the

See id. at 736–37 (arguing that traffic stop based on an

anonymous allegation of an intoxicated driver is substantially
different from a Terry stop and frisk where the anonymous tip is
about a firearm).
104

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008)

(vacating conviction where traffic stop was based only on an
anonymous tip with no corroboration of criminality); McChesney
v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999) (holding no reasonable
suspicion where officer did not personally witness alleged
erratic driving); State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640–45 (N.D.
1994) (holding the anonymous tip was “short on reliability, . .
. short on specifics,” and uncorroborated by police
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Supreme Court’s reasoning in J.L., and similarly do not view the
danger presented by a potentially intoxicated motorist as
justifying an exception to the reliability requirement.105

observation); Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1243–46
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding stop based on anonymous tip
invalid where officer tailed vehicle for two miles without
witnessing erratic driving, nor corroborated predictions of
future behavior); State v. Boyle, 793 So. 2d 1281, 1284–85 (La.
Ct. App. 2001) (reversing conviction that resulted from
anonymous tip where officers did not observe any unusual driving
and stop took place on suspect’s private property); Commonwealth
v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)
(finding officer’s corroboration of only readily observable
details insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for a
Terry stop).
105

See Brief of Mothers Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae

in Support of Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14 (“In such states,
anonymous tips serve only to help the police to locate a
possible drunk driver; to intervene, however, the officer must
wait until he or she observes the driver engage in imminently
dangerous driving.”); York, supra note 30, at 185–86
(postulating that while the courts’ specific reasons for
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Accordingly, “[i]n such states, anonymous tips serve only to
help the police to locate a possible drunk driver; to intervene,
however, the officer must wait until he or she observes the
driver engage in imminently dangerous driving.”106

Moreover,

some of these courts reiterate the fear expressed in J.L. that
allowing an erratic driving exception would invite potential
abuse by those seeking to harass innocent persons.107

invalidating stops based solely on anonymous tips have varied,
their essential justification has been consistent).
106

Brief of Mothers Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in

Support of Petitioner, supra note 80, at 14 (explaining the
minority view of the role played by anonymous tips).
107

See McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1077 (recognizing potential for

abuse in allowing a reliability exception for anonymous tips of
drunk driving); Wilson, supra note 57, at 229–30 (acknowledging
abuse potential created by an exception to the reliability
analysis).

In fact, even courts that allow reliance on such

tips expressly acknowledge this risk.

See Wheat, 278 F.3d at

735 (admitting anonymous tips of erratic driving may be
completely fabricated as a means to harass other motorists, but
arguing that the risk of falsified tips is insufficient to
prevent all investigatory traffic stops based on anonymous
tips).

But see Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Del.
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McChesney v. State,108 a case from the Supreme Court of
Wyoming, is indicative of the approach taken by these
jurisdictions.109

A police dispatcher broadcast an anonymously

received tip which alleged that a red Mercury with temporary
license plates was being driven erratically, but gave no
indication that the tipster had inside knowledge regarding the
Mercury’s driver.110

An officer proceeded to follow a vehicle

matching the description and subsequently initiated a traffic
stop without actually witnessing any erratic or illegal
driving.111

On review, the court held the seizure invalid and

reversed the ensuing drug conviction because the anonymous
caller provided no predictive information and the officer failed
to independently corroborate the alleged criminal act, since he

2004) (arguing that anonymous tips of erratic driving are
unlikely because it requires knowledge of the vehicle, its
location, and its direction of travel, and needs police to be
readily able to stop the vehicle).
108

988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 1999).

109

See, e.g., supra note 104 (listing cases not permitting

traffic stops solely on bare-boned anonymous tips of possibly
intoxicated drivers).
110

See McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073.

111

See id.
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did not personally witness any erratic behavior before stopping
the vehicle and instead relied solely on the anonymous
bare-boned tip, whose reliability was unknown.112
Similarly, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts invalidated a
traffic stop where the detaining officer did not corroborate the
erratic driving alleged in an anonymous tip.113

An anonymous

motorist called police to report that a particular pickup truck
was travelling on the wrong side of the highway, and then called
back to report the vehicle had crossed the median back to the
proper traffic lanes.114

Police, relying exclusively on the

information from the tip, stopped a truck matching the

112

See id. at 1077–78 (holding police lacked reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop because the
anonymous tip itself was not sufficiently reliable and the
officer failed to independently corroborate the anonymously
alleged criminal activity by observing suspicious behavior
necessary to form the reasonable suspicion required to initiate
the stop).
113

See Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2000) (announcing corroboration of only obvious details
provided by an anonymous tip does not establish reasonable
suspicion to initiate a traffic stop).
114

Id. at 290.
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description and subsequently charged the motorist with an
alcohol-related offense.115

In reversing the convictions, the

court emphasized that reasonable suspicion cannot be based
solely on corroboration of readily apparent details from a
bare-boned anonymous tip.116
C.

Adoption of the Minority Approach in Virginia v.

Harris and the Subsequent Denial of Certiorari
Consistent with the viewpoint expressed by the minority of
states that have heard this issue, the Supreme Court of Virginia
overturned a DUI conviction where the initial vehicle stop was
based entirely on a bare-boned anonymous tip of erratic
driving.117

On December 31, 2005, a police dispatcher informed

Officer Picard of an anonymous call reporting that an
intoxicated driver named Joseph Harris was travelling south in

115

Id.

116

Id. at 291 (explaining that while the officer did corroborate

some details, the corroboration included no facts “which were
not otherwise easily obtainable by an uninformed bystander”).
117

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008)

(asserting that an anonymous tip lacking in information with
which to establish the informant’s basis of knowledge or
credibility cannot solely form the basis of reasonable suspicion
for a Terry stop).
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the 3400 block of Meadowbridge Road in a green Nissan Altima
bearing a partial license plate number of Y8066.118

While

Officer Picard was provided with considerable detail about the
motorist, he was not given any details about the anonymous
caller nor the timeframe in which the tipster observed the
motorist.119

After responding to the location, Office Picard

proceeded to follow a green Nissan Altima with license plate
number YAR–8046 headed southbound.120

The officer followed

Harris’s vehicle some distance—during which time the vehicle did
not speed or swerve—until Harris stopped on his own accord, at
which point Officer Picard initiated a traffic stop.121

118

Id. at 144.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

During

While Harris did not speed or swerve, Harris’s brake

lights did flash three times before the Nissan Altima pulled
over on the side of the road.

Id. (stating that Harris

activated the vehicle’s brake lights three times:

(1) at an

intersection despite having right of way, (2) 50 feet prior to
stopping at a red light, (3) and finally while completely
stopped at the red light).
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the stop Harris exhibited signs of intoxication and failed a
field sobriety test and was subsequently convicted of DUI.122
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that Harris’s Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated and consequently reversed the
conviction.123

While Harris argued the traffic stop was invalid

because it had been based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip,
Virginia asserted that the anonymous tip, combined with Picard’s
observations at the traffic stop, created reasonable suspicion
to justify the stop.124

The court concluded that the seizure was

unwarranted because the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia
of reliability and Officer Picard had not independently
witnessed any reasonably suspicious conduct prior to initiating
the stop.125

122

Furthermore, the court expressed concern that by

See id. (noting that Harris stumbled as he exited his vehicle

and had watery eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of
alcohol on his breath).
123

Id. at 147 (holding that the officer’s observations and the

anonymous tip did not create a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity sufficient to initiate a traffic stop).
124

Id. at 145.

125

See id. at 146 (voicing that an anonymous tip that cannot

establish the tipster’s basis of knowledge or credibility
“cannot, of itself, establish the requisite quantum of suspicion
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providing the tip anonymously, the caller could lie to the
police without consequence since the tipster’s anonymity made
him immune to the penalties for providing false information.126
Justice Kinser dissented from the ruling and in doing so
echoed many of the sentiments expressed by those jurisdictions
allowing stops bases solely on an anonymous tip.127

The

for an investigative stop”); see also id. (explaining that
predictive information in an anonymous tip is unnecessary if
police can corroborate the tip with observable criminal actions,
which was not done in this instance).

The court explained

further that while Harris’s pumping of his vehicle’s brakes was
unusual, it did not objectively indicate an intoxicated driver.
See id. at 146–47 (emphasizing that law enforcement must view
behavior that objectively indicates intoxication in order to
initiate a traffic stop based on personal observation).
126

See id. at 146 (echoing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in J.L.

by noting that an unknown informant who does not provide
information in person may be impervious to penalty from
perjury); see also VA. CODE ANN. §18.2-461 (West 2010) (explaining
the penalty for providing false information to police).
127

Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 148 (Kinser, J.,

dissenting).

Two other justices joined Justice Kinser’s

dissent, leading to a 4–3 decision.
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Id.

dissenting Justice stressed the danger presented by erratic
drivers required a concomitantly greater need for quick
action.128

Moreover, she argued that the tip’s prediction of a

direction of travel and the officer’s corroboration of innocent
details weighed in favor of the tip’s reliability and inferred
the veracity of the non-corroborated criminal allegations.129
Following the Virginia Supreme Court’s reversal, the
Commonwealth unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari.130

In an impassioned dissent from the

denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts urged the Court to
take up the issue in light of the split of authority.131

He

highlighted the frequency of alcohol-related traffic deaths and
then argued that by allowing the Virginia ruling to stand, the
Court was effectively allowing drunk drivers “one free

128

See id. at 149 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (criticizing the

majority for ignoring the danger presented by drunk drivers).
129

See id. at 148 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (suggesting an

anonymous tip’s alleged criminal acts can be presumed where its
innocent details are verified).
130

Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (mem.).

131

See id. at 11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing the

split of authority on what level of corroboration is needed to
initiate a traffic stop alleging an intoxicated motorist).
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swerve,”132 thus creating the potential for needless tragedy.133
Moreover, he argued that the imminence of danger posed by
potential drunk drivers might justify forgoing a requirement
that an officer observe suspicious behavior before initiating a
stop.134

And while he acknowledged the Court’s holding in J.L.

about bare-boned anonymous tips, he reasoned that those
limitations might not apply to anonymous tips about erratic
driving.135

In sum, the Chief Justice suggested that given the

132

Id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

133

See id. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The decision

below commands that police officers following a driver reported
to be drunk do nothing until they see the driver actually do
something unsafe on the road—by which time it may be too
late.”).
134

See id. at 11 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (weighing the

imminence of danger posed by intoxicated motorists to the
imminence of danger posed in other circumstances).
135

See id. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing anonymous

tips about erratic driving may not require corroboration and
suggesting a lesser expectation of privacy in vehicles might
exempt such tips from the reliability analysis); cf. id. at 11
n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (listing instances in which the
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danger at stake, law enforcement might be justified in acting
solely on the basis of an anonymous tip that alleges a drunk or
dangerous driver.136
III.

Analysis
While the use of alcohol on our nation’s roadways is a

serious concern,137 the solution to that problem should not come

Court affirmed anti-drunk-driving policies that might be
considered unconstitutional under other circumstances).
136

See id. at 12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that

“[t]he conflict is clear and the stakes are high” and charging
that law enforcement should be able to use “every legitimate
tool at their disposal for getting drunk drivers off the road”).
137

See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (“Drunk driving

is a nationwide problem, as evidenced by the efforts of
legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose appropriate
penalties.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558–59
(1983) (acknowledging that “[Drunk driving] occurs with tragic
frequency on our Nation’s highways” and highlighting the Court’s
previous recognition of the issue); see also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., 2007 TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT—ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING
FATALITIES 2 (2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811016.PDF
(finding that at least 12,500 alcohol-impaired driving
fatalities have occurred annually since 1998).
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at the price of further encroaching on citizens’ Fourth
Amendment freedoms.

Jurisdictions that allow police to rely

solely on an anonymous tip of erratic driving for a traffic stop
incorrectly base their reasoning more on emotional appeals and
inaccurate generalizations than on a logical analysis of the
circumstances surrounding investigatory traffic stops.138
However, law enforcement cannot, in accordance with legal
principles and factual circumstances, base an investigatory
traffic stop exclusively on a bare-boned anonymous tip about
drunk driving because such a tip neither fulfills the
reliability analysis discussed in J.L.139 nor merits an exception
to the reasonable suspicion requirement.

As a result, where the

information contained in an anonymous tip provides no means to
test the informant’s credibility, police must corroborate the
criminal allegations from the tip, rather than just those

138

See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003)

(“A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver is an
instrument of death.”); State v. Contreras, 79 P.3d 1111, 1116
(N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasizing the State’s serious concern
over the potential threat posed by an intoxicated motorist).
139

See generally Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000)

(discussing the methodology for establishing reliability of an
anonymous tip alleging possession of a firearm).
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details that are readily apparent, before initiating a traffic
stop.
A.

Traffic Stops are Invasive Seizures

Contrary to the notion that an investigatory traffic stop
is merely an inconsequential and limited intrusion, a mandatory
police detention of a motorist is, in and of itself, an invasive
seizure accompanied by the attendant impositions on one’s
liberty.140

Just as when a police officer detains a person on

the street, an investigatory traffic stop is a seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.141

Thus, while the form of

the interaction may differ, a traffic stop can similarly be an
uncomfortable and inconvenient interaction in which the motorist

140

See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (explaining

that police initiated vehicle stops, like other mandatory police
encounters, interfere with citizens’ liberty interests).
141

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996)

(“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an
automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and
for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’
within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].”).
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is subject to protracted public embarrassment.142

Consequently,

the Court has recognized that a traffic stop, like a Terry stop
and frisk, similarly interferes with one’s liberty interest to
proceed without undue intrusion.143

Moreover, beyond the initial

detention an investigatory traffic stop can readily transform
into a further hands-on search and additional legal
ramifications should the officer subsequently discover other
indications of criminality during the stop.144

142

Accordingly, an

See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (commenting that traffic stops

can be time-consuming, inconvenient, and angst-ridden forced
interactions).
143

See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984) (“[A]

traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of
the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained
vehicle.”); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657 (voicing that an
investigatory traffic stop interferes with one’s freedom of
movement and liberty).
144

E.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724–25 (8th Cir.

2001)(noting that the detaining officer’s discovery of a
recently discarded paper bag containing crack cocaine lying next
to a vehicle detained on the basis of an anonymous tip led to an
extensive search of the car and subsequent arrests for
possession of controlled substances); Harris v. Commonwealth,
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investigatory traffic stop is sufficiently analogous to a Terry
stop on the street as to warrant not treating anonymous tips
about erratic driving differently than anonymous tips in other
contexts.
B.

Bare-boned Information Provided Anonymously Cannot Be

Presumptively Reliable Without Adequate Corroboration
While an investigatory traffic stop must be warranted by at
least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,145 a
bare-boned anonymous tip about drunk driving does not by itself
establish this level of suspicion because it neither indicates
the informant’s credibility or basis of knowledge nor provides a
way to verify its criminal allegations.146

Moreover, the fact

668 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 2008) (explaining that the detaining
officer observed signs of intoxication only after initiating the
traffic stop, which resulted in an arrest for DUI).
145

See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)

(applying Terry standards to investigatory traffic stops);
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 144 (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (“An investigative stop must be justified by
a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable
facts, that criminal activity is ‘afoot.’”).
146

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (detailing that

a bare-boned anonymous tip that contains no predictive
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that someone can provide a detailed description of a motorist
does nothing to show that the tipster is actually privy to
inside information about that motorist.147

Thus, because

confirming the readily observable innocent information from a
tip cannot demonstrate the tipster’s reliability in regards to
the criminal allegations, this level of corroboration cannot be
used as the sole basis for a Terry stop.148

To justify a seizure

information to show its source has inside knowledge lacks even a
“moderate indicia of reliability”).
147

See id. at 272 (stating a bare-boned anonymous tip may help

locate a particular person but does not show the tipster’s basis
of knowledge about alleged criminal acts); United States v.
Martinez, 486 F.3d 855, 864 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
unverified anonymous tip accusing a particular person of having
weapons used in the commission of a violent crime but providing
no predictive information did not establish reasonable suspicion
to conduct a traffic stop).
148

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (stressing that an anonymous tip

must be reliable in its allegation of illegality to establish
reasonable suspicion, not just in its ability to identify a
person); Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 145 (recognizing
that predictive information must related to alleged criminal
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exclusively on a physical description of a vehicle, its general
location, or its direction of travel would be no more valid than
a seizure based entirely on finding a person standing at a
particular bus stop.149

Therefore, while an officer may use an

anonymous tipster’s description of a particular motorist as a
means to locate the accused individual, police cannot also
presume the criminal allegations are true simply because they
located someone matching that description.150
Additionally, to presume the veracity of an anonymous
caller’s unconfirmed allegations would be to circumvent the
already existing requirement that police objectively judge
whether a motorist’s driving is sufficiently unusual to warrant

activity if it will be used to strengthen a tipster’s
reliability or basis of knowledge).
149

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (rejecting corroboration of a

matching physical description and location as grounds to conduct
a Terry stop and frisk).
150

See id. (explaining that police may use a tip’s description

of a particular person to narrow their focus, but cannot use the
accuracy of that description as a basis of suspicion about a
criminal act).
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a traffic stop.151

While a valid traffic stop must be grounded

on facts that objectively suggest criminal behavior,152 an

151

See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985)

(stating law enforcement may detain a vehicle where the
officer’s suspicion of criminality is objectively reasonable
based on specific and articulable facts); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (articulating that an officer’s experience
entitles him to draw specific inferences from the available
facts); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 521 (Wis. 2001)
(detailing that reasonable suspicion must be based on specific
facts and inferences that objectively warrant a police officer
to believe criminal activity is taking place).
152

See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (declaring that an officer may

conduct an investigative stop if he “observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot. . . .”); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1981) (applying Terry
reasonable suspicion to the vehicle context); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d at 146 (discussing subjective versus
objective indications of suspicious behavior); see also NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., THE VISUAL DETECTION
EXPLANATION

OF THE

OF

DWI MOTORISTS:

24 DRIVING CUES,

http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/dwi/dwihtml/cues.
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anonymous informant may subjectively view certain conduct as
indicative of drunk driving that, when objectively considered,
would fail to raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.153

If police can rely on a bare anonymous report of

erratic driving simply by locating a vehicle matching the
description within a particular area, it bypasses the
requirement that a stop be objectively reasonable and allows
police to detain merely on the untested word of an unknown third
party.154

Rather, a more appropriate use for these anonymous

htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (detailing common indicators
used by law enforcement to identify possible motorist
intoxication).
153

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d at 146 (rejecting an

argument that a motorist’s unusual behavior objectively
indicated criminal activity); see also Anderegg, supra note 72,
at 56 (“In the case of cell phones, the danger stems from the
ease with which a police investigation can be set in motion
based on what appears to be suspicious, but may ultimately turn
out to be innocuous, activity.”).
154

See Anderegg, supra note 72, at 54 (discussing the difficulty

of discrediting an anonymous report of drunk driving when police
do not independently corroborate the assertion); cf. York, supra
note 30, at 195–96 (quoting United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d
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tips is to use them to direct the focus of law enforcement so as
to put officers in a position to act should they independently
observe suspicious behavior.155
C.

Anonymous Tips of Drunk Driving Do Not Warrant an

Extraordinary Danger Exception to the Reliability Analysis
Having established that a bare-boned anonymous tip about
erratic driving would fail the traditional reliability analysis,
the extraordinary danger exception suggested in J.L., which
would automatically establish reasonable suspicion whenever an
anonymous caller alleges drunk driving, similarly cannot be used
to justify these investigatory traffic stops.

An anonymous

allegation of erratic driving does not present such an immense

722, 724 (8th Cir. 2001)) (arguing against a corroboration
requirement by suggesting that “[c]ourts should [] require that
the informant allege behavior that amounts to an actual traffic
violation.

For example, an allegation that a person is ‘driving

like a complete maniac,’ standing alone, should be
insufficient.”).
155

Accord J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (suggesting an anonymous tip can

be used to locate the particular person who the tipster means to
accuse).
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danger as to excuse regular Fourth Amendment necessities.156
Furthermore, such an exception would “rove too far”157 because it
would be difficult to limit to just reports of intoxicated
driving158 and would provide an outlet for invidious,
consequence-free harassment of otherwise innocent motorists.159

156

See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 818 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar,

J., dissenting) (dismissing the notion that crimes can be placed
on a sliding scale in which the seriousness of the crime is
inversely proportionate to the showing required for an
investigatory stop and further arguing that drunk driving, while
serious, is not “so great” as to warrant a reliability
exception); cf. Wilson, supra note 57, at 229 (contending that
allowing an extraordinary danger exception for bare-boned
anonymous tips would entirely destroy Fourth Amendment
protections).
157

J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.

158

E.g., State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 527 n.10 (Wis.

2001) (allowing traffic stops based on anonymous reports of
either erratic or drunk driving).
159

See McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999)

(considering potential for abuse in allowing reliance
exclusively on anonymous tips asserting drunk driving).
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As the Court declared in J.L., “the Fourth Amendment is not so
easily satisfied.”160
1.

Drunk driving is inconsistent with the extreme

danger theorized in J.L.
While alcohol-related traffic accidents are unquestionably
an issue of national concern,161 a single instance of drunk
driving does not pose such an extraordinary danger as to justify
a blanket exception from the showing of reliability.162

160

J.L., 529, U.S. at 273 (rejecting a categorical exception for

firearms due to the ease with which an exception in one type of
Fourth Amendment cases can be translated and applied to other
subjects).
161

See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451

(1990) (“No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the
drunken driving problem or the States’ interest in eradicating
it.”).
162

See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 818 (Cal. 2006) (Werdegar,

J., dissenting) (arguing the danger posed by a drunk driver is
not so different from that posed by a concealed firearm to
justify a different Fourth Amendment standard).

Further, the

dissenting opinion notes the danger presented by an intoxicated
motorist varies depending on environmental factors:

in this

instance, the time of night and lack of other motorists
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Jurisdictions that hold that DUI poses such an imminent danger
as to fall within the theorized danger exception are confusing
magnitude with frequency:

while the Court in J.L. spoke in

terms of a danger “so great as to justify a search even without
a showing of reliability,”163 the proponents of an erratic
driving exception instead rely on statistical probability and
rate of occurrence.164

Furthermore, advocates of such an

considerably diminished the risk of danger from an intoxicated
driver.

See id. at 819 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).

The Supreme

Court, while recognizing the risks created by intoxicated
drivers, has declared that the crime of DUI cannot be considered
a violent or aggressive crime.

See Begay v. United States, 128

S. Ct. 1581, 1588 (2008) (holding that DUI is categorically
different from the Armed Career Criminal Act’s meaning of a
violent felony); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004)
(declining to categorize negligent drunk driving that causes
serious bodily injury as a crime of violence that would
constitute an aggravated felony under the Immigration and
Nationality Act).
163

J.L., 529 U.S. at 273.

164

Compare id. (suggesting a danger may be so great as to

justify a constitutional exception), with Brief of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
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exception assume, based on the frequency of alcohol-related
accidents, that it is inevitable that an intoxicated motorist
will cause an accident and consequently presume that the longer
a motorist is on the road, the greater the likelihood they will
crash.165

However, while every time a bomb is set off it will

cause a destructive explosion, the same level of certainty is

supra note 80, at 4–7 (discussing the probability of
alcohol-related vehicular accidents and the frequency of such
accidents nationwide).

Despite the proponents’ contentions,

evidence indicates traffic fatalities may actually be in
decline.

See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:

2005 DATA: OVERVIEW 1 (2005),
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810623.PDF (suggesting that a
nationwide safety belt use rate of 82 percent and a three
percent reduction in the rate of fatal crashes involving alcohol
between 1995 and 2005 significantly contributed to a ten-year
decline in the national traffic fatality rate).
165

See State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000) (analogizing

a possibly drunk motorist to a mobile bomb); Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing against requiring
police corroboration of alleged erratic driving by reasoning
that the longer the officer waits, the greater the likelihood of
an accident).
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not present every time an intoxicated person gets behind the
wheel of a car.166

Moreover, circumstantial factors such as

time, location, presence of other vehicles, and attributes of
the driver will affect the likelihood of injury, even presuming
the motorist will crash.167

166

See Wells, 136 P.3d at 819 (Werdegar, J., dissenting)

(reasoning that the danger posed by an intoxicated motorist is
not constant, and largely depends on other factors such as time
of day, location, and presence of other motorists); see also
United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736–37 (8th Cir. 2001)
(explaining three possible outcomes when observing a potentially
intoxicated driver:

the driver exhibits no erratic behavior,

the driver exhibits erratic behavior that is harmless, or the
driver exhibits erratic behavior that leads to injury).
167

See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: 2007 DATA:

OVERVIEW 1 (2008), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810993.PDF
[hereinafter 2007 DATA] (describing categories in which
alcohol-related fatalities were most common).

2007 statistics

indicate that traffic fatalities were most likely for male
drivers, those under the age of 25, drivers who were speeding,
and motorists driving cars/light trucks.

Id. at 7, 10, 11.

Alcohol-related fatalities most frequently occurred for drivers
with a blood alcohol content of at least 0.08 g/dL, who were
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Additionally, while it may be true that waiting to observe
erratic behavior could allow an accident to occur in the
interim, this ignores the role that an anonymous tip can play
even when further corroboration is required.

The Chief Justice

lamented in his dissent from the denial of certiorari that
allowing the decision below to stand meant police would not be
able to initiate a stop on an anonymous tip, “even for a quick
check,”168 which would likely lead to needless death.169

speeding, and those between 21 and 24 years old.

Yet,

Id. at 5, 7.

Further, males were approximately three times more likely to be
involved in a fatal crash than females, and were twice as likely
to be legally intoxicated.
COMPTON & AMY BERNING, RESULTS
AND

DRUG USE

BY

Id. at 11–12.

OF THE

See generally RICHARD

2007 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY

OF

ALCOHOL

DRIVERS 1–2 (2009),

http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/Traffic%20Injury%20Co
ntrol/Articles/Associated%20Files/811175.pdf (concluding that
factors such as time of day, day of the week, vehicle type, as
well as the age and gender of the driver, dramatically impact
the likelihood a randomly selected driver will be legally
intoxicated).
168

Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (mem.) (Roberts,

C.J., dissenting).
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this argument overlooks the fact that these anonymous
allegations of criminal activity allow law enforcement to aim
their attention at possibly intoxicated motorists of which they
would otherwise be unaware.170

Therefore, while not directly

justifying a stop, a bare-boned anonymous tip alerts police to a
potentially intoxicated driver and allows them to observe the
motorist and immediately initiate a stop once they see
suspicious behavior.171

169

And certainly, should the motorist cease

See id. (implying requiring corroboration of anonymous tips

will dramatically impact the safety of other motorists); see
also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736–37 (justifying a traffic stop based
on an anonymous tip by noting that because police lack the
option of a consensual encounter they must wait to observe
erratic driving, which might allow an opportunity for an
accident).
170

Accord Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (suggesting

an anonymous tip can be used to locate the particular person who
the tipster means to accuse).
171

See, e.g., State v. Lafond, 802 A.2d 425, 430 (Me. 2002)

(upholding stop based on anonymous report of a possibly
intoxicated motorist where the officer found a matching vehicle
and observed it swerve and cross the white fog line before
initiating the traffic stop).
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driving while being observed, the officer would subsequently be
free to initiate a consensual interaction.
Furthermore, there also does not appear to be a substantial
difference in alcohol-related traffic fatalities rates between
states that allow the use of anonymous tips as justification for
a traffic stop and those that do not.172

In fact, even within

states that permit traffic stops based solely on anonymous tips,
the rate of alcohol-related traffic fatalities fluctuates
annually, which suggests that relying on anonymous tips does not
counteract other factors affecting the likelihood of a vehicular
accident.173

172

At the national level, the rate of traffic

See NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: RESEARCH

NOTE: FATALITIES

AND

FATALITY RATES

IN

ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED-DRIVING CRASHES

BY

STATE, 2007–2008 3 (2009),
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811250.PDF [hereinafter CRASHES
2007–2008] (stating that from 2007 to 2008, the alcohol-impaired
driving fatality rate declined in forty states, remained
constant in three, and rose in seven).
173

Compare NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS:

RESEARCH NOTE: FATALITIES
CRASHES

BY

AND

FATALITY RATES

IN

ALCOHOL-IMPAIRED DRIVING

STATE, 2006–2007 3 (2009),

http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811099.PDF (indicating that
between 2006 and 2007 the alcohol-impaired driving fatality rate

80

fatalities involving alcohol has largely been either stable or
in decline over the last several decades, due to a variety of
factors including demographics and widely-adopted legislative
enactments, such as minimum drinking age requirements.174

in Kansas decreased 0.03 fatalities per 100 million vehicle
miles traveled while New Hampshire experienced a decrease of
0.09), with CRASHES 2007–2008, supra note 172, at 3 (showing that
the alcohol-impaired driving fatality rate for Kansas rose 36.1
percent from 2007 to 2008, while New Hampshire experienced a 40
percent increase).

Kansas allowed traffic stops based on

anonymous tips of erratic driving in 2003, while New Hampshire
has allowed such stops since 2004.

See State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d

1284, 1290 (N.H. 2004) (permitting stops based on anonymous tips
of erratic driving when the caller provides sufficient detail
and purports to witness the erratic behavior and police locate a
matching vehicle in a short enough timeframe); State v.
Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 120 (Kan. 2003) (upholding stop based on
anonymous report of dangerous driving).
174

See 2007 DATA, supra note 167, at 1 (stating that in both 1997

and 2007, approximately 30 percent of traffic fatalities
involved alcohol); NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
OF

ALCOHOL-RELATED DRIVING TRENDS, 1982–2005 vii, 40 (2008),

http://www.nhtsa.gov/ (follow “Traffic Safety” hyperlink; then
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Collectively, this evidence suggests an extreme danger exception
may be unwarranted in this context and calls into question the
effectiveness of permitting reliance on anonymous tips about
drunk driving.
2.

Drunk driving exception leads to a slippery slope

of other exceptions
Additionally, if an investigatory traffic stop is permitted
to be based exclusively on an anonymous allegation of drunk
driving, such an allowance cannot readily be limited to tips

follow “Impaired Driving” hyperlink; then follow “Statistical
Analysis of Alcohol-Related Driving Trends, 1982–2005”
hyperlink) (finding that alcohol laws, such as administrative
license revocation or Minimum Legal Drinking Age 21, and
demographics were responsible for significantly reducing the
percentage of intoxicated drivers involved in fatal crashes
between 1982 and 2005); NAT’L INST.’S

OF

HEALTH, FACT SHEET:

ALCOHOL-RELATED TRAFFIC DEATHS 1, http://www.nih.gov/ (follow “Site
Map” hyperlink; then follow “Research Results for the Public”
hyperlink; then follow “Alcohol-Related Traffic Deaths”
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (noting a 50 percent
decline in alcohol-related traffic fatalities over the past
three decades, due in part to adjustments in the legal drinking
age and nationwide enactment of Zero Tolerance laws).
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within that context.

In J.L., the Court stated that if a

bare-boned anonymous tip about firearms could justify a Terry
frisk, that reasoning would likely authorize police action in
other instances where firearms are likely to be found, such as
where a bare-boned anonymous tip alleges illegal drugs.175

The

Court quickly pronounced that such inevitable lateral
applications of the original exception would not satisfy the
Fourth Amendment.176

In essence, the Court expressed concern

that to allow such an exception would swallow the rule.177
To sanction reliance on bare anonymous allegations of drunk
driving would also inexorably lead to the use of anonymous tips

175

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 273 (extrapolating that an exception

for anonymous tips about firearms would lead to similar
exceptions for drugs because many jurisdictions recognize that
firearms and narcotics often go hand-in-hand).
176

See id. (indicating that allowing anonymous tips about

firearms to be used to rely on anonymous tips in other contexts
would not satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
177

See id. (speculating that allowing an exception in one aspect

would inevitably lead to numerous other exceptions, thus
defeating the purpose of the original rule).
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in other analogous contexts.178

While many jurisdictions

recognize that alcohol may be a major contributor to unusual or
dangerous driving, they are also aware it is not the only
factor.179
To

be

As explained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
sure,

intoxication

cause of erratic driving.

is

not

the

only

possible

Erratic driving can be the

result of something as innocuous as the driver waving
at a bee in the car or something as serious as the
driver having a heart attack.

But regardless of the

cause, erratic driving can be very dangerous and often
is symptomatic of intoxication.180

178

See, e.g., Anderegg, supra note 72, at 54 (stating that, in

general, jurisdictions that permit traffic stops based solely on
anonymous tips do not require a specific allegation of drunk
driving, but rather any driving that can be characterized as
erratic).
179

See id. (commenting that jurisdictions allowing anonymous

tips do not specifically require the caller allege that an
erratic driver is drunk).
180

State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 527 n.10 (Wis. 2001)

(justifying traffic stops based on allegations of erratic,
rather than exclusively drunk, driving).
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Thus, if an exception for anonymous tips alleging an intoxicated
motorist is valid, certainly a tip simply alleging erratic or
dangerous driving would suffice.181

Furthermore, if an anonymous

tip of drunk driving is sufficient, it is reasonable to believe
allegations of other behavior that similarly produce dangerous
or erratic driving—such as text messaging while driving—might
also justify a Terry stop.182

Consequently, allowing an

exception due to the danger posed by potentially drunk drivers
invites a multitude of other exceptions with no discernable
endpoint:

a result specifically condemned by the Supreme

Court.183

181

See id. (voicing that because erratic driving is dangerous

and often indicative of intoxication, “an officer may make a
traffic stop to investigate observations or reliable reports of
erratic driving”).
182

See Frank A Drews et al., Text Messaging During Simulated

Driving, 51

HUMAN FACTORS

1, 5–6 (2009) (addressing behaviors that

result from text messaging while driving, which leads to an
increased likelihood of vehicle collisions, including:

slower

reaction time, increased following distance, and inadvertent
lane departures).
183

See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273 (2000) (declining to

create a firearms exception for bare-boned anonymous tips due in
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3.

Drunk driving exception would allow tipsters to

“lie with impunity”184
When a bare-boned anonymous tip asserting drunk driving is
given enough weight to automatically permit police action it
invites anonymous callers to “lie with impunity,”185 and can lead
government agents to unintentionally harass or annoy innocent
people.186

The Supreme Court has recognized that this threat of

misuse significantly overshadows the unconditional acceptance of
an anonymous tip based on the danger it alleges.187

While those

in favor of allowing anonymous tips about drunk driving
acknowledge this inherent risk of abuse, they argue it is
outweighed by the need for preemptive action against the

part to the ease with which such an exception could be applied
elsewhere).
184

Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

185

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

186

See Harris v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008)

(observing that the informant‘s anonymity meant he could not be
subject to penalty for providing false information to police).
187

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 (declining to adopt a firearms

exception in part because of the potential for abuse).
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imminent danger posed by a possibly intoxicated driver.188
However, this erroneously assumes that as the danger alleged by
a tipster increases, the more the tip should be considered
presumptively reliable.189

188

As long as an anonymous tipster’s

See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 735 (8th Cir. 2001)

(admitting contemporaneous accounts of erratic driving may be
completely fabricated to harass other motorists, but arguing
that this risk is insufficient to prevent police from conducting
investigatory traffic stops); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071,
1077 (Wyo. 1999) (recognizing potential for abuse in anonymous
tips of drunk driving).

But see Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d

1212, 1220 (Del. 2004) (reasoning that fabricated tips would be
unlikely because it requires knowledge of a vehicle, its
location, and its direction of travel, and requires police to be
readily able to stop the vehicle).
189

See Wilson, supra note 57, at 229–30 (arguing a extreme

danger exception is logically flawed because “the more
inflammatory and outrageous the 911 report, the more reliable
the origin.”).

But cf. Bryk, supra note 3, at 280, 303

(suggesting a sliding scale of reasonableness, in which inherent
danger and the need for police corroboration are inversely
proportionate, and concluding that an anonymous tip of an
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credibility remains untested and they cannot be held accountable
for the information they provide, there is an ever-present,
unacceptable risk of falsified information.190

Rather than

downplaying the likelihood of fabrication,191 jurisdictions could
work to reduce the anonymity of tips, which would allow police
to rely on the information while minimizing the potential for
abuse.192

intoxicated motorist is sufficiently inherently dangerous to
only require corroboration of basic descriptive information).
190

See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(commenting that where an informant is completely anonymous, the
chance tips will be fabricated is too great to be permitted).
191

See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Virginia v. Harris, 130

S. Ct. 10 (2009) (No. 08-1385) (“[A]lthough the extent of prank
calls of drunk driving is unknown, the fearsome toll taken by
drunk drivers is all too obvious.”).
192

See State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 525–26 (Wis. 2001)

(upholding stop based on anonymous tip in which the tipster told
the police dispatcher his location in relation to the alleged
erratic driver, remained on the phone until an officer
responded, and then pulled his vehicle over after telling the
dispatcher the officer was following the correct vehicle); id.
at 528 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging policies to
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IV.

Proposal and Conclusion
Rather than attempting to distinguish anonymous tips about

intoxicated motorists from tips in other contexts or create
circumstance-specific exceptions to Fourth Amendment
requirements, a more reasoned solution is to work to reduce the
anonymity of anonymous tips about erratic driving.193

As Justice

ensure stops based on motorist’s tips are lawful, such as having
police dispatchers asking the motorist to pull over at the
scene); State v. Marks, No. MV99407373S, 2000 WL 33298878, at
*5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2000) (validating stop based
entirely on an anonymous tip because the unidentified tipster
remained on the phone with police dispatcher for five minutes
and “clearly relay[ed] his first hand observations” in extensive
detail).

But see Anderson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 696

N.W.2d 918, 919 (N.D. 2005) (invalidating a stop in which a
tipster reported and described a vehicle they were following
that was being erratically driven and then stayed on the phone
to provide updates to police).

The call here was not completely

anonymous as police had a description of the tipster’s vehicle
and witnessed the tipster’s vehicle pull over.
193

Id. at 923.

See Lisenby, supra note 73, 183 (arguing that police should

make reasonable attempts to establish a caller’s identity and
further suggesting that the risk of fewer informants—due to the
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Kennedy observed nearly ten years ago, police departments can
employ a variety of means to reduce a source’s anonymity or
bolster an anonymous informant’s credibility.194

Certainly, even

greater technological resources are at the disposal of police
officers today, and improvements to wireless technology might
actually mean that anonymity could become a technological
impossibility.195

Yet even in the limited circumstances where

fear of identification—is outweighed by ensuring officers
conduct reasonable searches based on informants’ tips).

When

the source of a tip is less anonymous, it is more likely their
reliability can be ascertained and that the tip can be used to
establish reasonable suspicion.

Cf. Wilson, supra note 57, at

221–22 (reasoning that anonymous tips that are provided
in-person allow for establishing credibility, demeanor,
knowledge basis, and identity of the tipster).
194

See J.L., 529 U.S. 275–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(suggesting ways to establish the identity or credibility of
anonymous callers, such as caller identification systems, call
logs and documentation systems, predictive information, and
voice recorders).
195

See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, WIRELESS 911 SERVICES,

http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html (last
visited February 20, 2010) (stating that approximately half of
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anonymity cannot be eliminated,196 officers can use the tip to
focus their attention and resources on a particular area and be
on the lookout for suspicious driving.

Furthermore, it is not

unreasonable to suggest that police, upon receiving an anonymous
tip, ask general follow-up questions to learn the source’s

all 911 calls now originate from wireless phones and explaining
that mandatory Enhanced 911 rules will allow a caller’s location
to be pinpointed to within 300 meters); Press Release, Nat’l
Highway Transp. Safety Admin., States and U.S. Territories
Receive $40 Million in Grants to Improve 911 Services (Sept. 28,
2009) http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/ (follow “NHTSA press room”
hyperlink; then follow “Go To 2009” hyperlink; then follow
“States and U.S. Territories Receive $40 Million in Grants to
Improve 911 Services” hyperlink) (detailing a proposed 40
million dollar grant authorized under the ENHANCE 911 Act to
upgrade state 9-1-1 call centers to provide automatic location
information for 9-1-1 calls originating from wireless and
Internet-connected telephones).
196

See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15,

at 29 (listing several circumstances in which tipsters will
remain anonymous, despite technological advances).
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identity or basis of knowledge.197

Thus, where police reduce the

anonymity of tips they receive, they should be better able to
rely on that information to initiate investigatory traffic
stops.198
As Chief Justice Roberts commented, “[t]he conflict is
clear and the stakes are high.”199

While this is true, the

stakes should be considered as a need to combat the nation’s
drunk driving problem in such a way that does not unreasonably
interfere with the average citizen’s constitutional rights.
Certainly, citizens should be encouraged to report erratic or
dangerous motorists, and police should generally be able to act
on those tips when they are sufficiently detailed.

197

However,

See Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 528 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring)

(recognizing the adoption of departmental policies designed to
promote the reliability of anonymous tips about erratic driving,
such as having police dispatchers ask motorists that are
anonymously reporting erratic driving to pull over at the
scene).
198

See generally, State v. Sousa, 855 A.2d 1284, 1287 (N.H.

2004) (discussing various mechanisms with which to increase the
reliability of anonymous tips).
199

Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (mem.) (Roberts,

C.J., dissenting).
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there is a clear division of authority over the role of
bare-boned anonymous calls to police about erratic driving, and
the rationales relied on by the majority of states that allow
reliance on such tips are illogical and inconsistent with Fourth
Amendment precedent.

As such, the Supreme Court should hear

this issue to resolve this discrepancy and provide a uniform law
consistent with the traditional application of the Fourth
Amendment:

when law enforcement cannot establish a caller’s

credibility, they should be required to take the relatively
minor step of corroborating the allegation to ensure there is a
reasonable basis for a seizure before initiating an
investigatory traffic stop.
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